Evolution of business

Moral: Wherein we look at the influence of families on the evolution of business as we try to understand the appeal of the chimera.

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Evolution? Yes, business reflects the times and the memes set. Time moves on, so too do things change.

At any point, some think that they may have reached an epitome. Dynasties arise. Some fall. Others amble on. Generation by generation expectations grow. 'Having it all' describes one type.

One can just see the mind storms of a well-endowed best-and-brightest on the Street (not Main) gloating in the bonuses (excessive by any definition) and fat-catting down life's highways, expecting that the getting will always be good (creating copy-cats).

Then, those who play took their balls home in order to stop the game, froze the economy, knew that their partners were as crooked as they, and more.

And, the common folk suffered.

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While doing research for an entirely different reason, I ran across a family that would serve as a good example (Moore). Henry, of the mid-1800s, epitomized the mentality behind buy-outs. One grandson was a decorated marine, a priest, and liberal. There will be others, to boot.

Looking further at this type of example would extend that done so far: backbone, commoners, non-commoners.

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The latest realm of busyness is heavily computational and global. Exploitation of workers, and consumers, is not new; we haven't learned the real lessons there, yet. When can we?

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It's not hopeless, though how many eons will be needed? Well, hopefully, it's not a PTIME issue. Yet, one knows that the lessons can be learned quickly, given the right circumstances. Which are? ... Another topic.

Remarks

12/15/2012 -- Coase, on the subject.

07/06/2012 -- Today, we have the one-year remembrance of George Edward Kimball III (GEK III). 

11/30/2011 -- Need to respect the bottom up. Will the computer finally let that come about?

08/30/2011 -- Essentially, we have financial piracy.

08/10/2011 -- Weird stock market. Removes all arguments for the legitimacy/sustainability of this financial mechanism; that is, how ought this be done in a civilized, sane manner?

08/08/2011 -- Oh well, Little Timmy is staying. Anyone for a DOW of 8K?

08/05/2011 -- In case there is a need to be more obvious (the meme: the chicken or the egg -- below), which is the oldest profession: head-butt or mate. Note, if you would, that the latter is usually preceded by the former, in many cases.

08/03/2011 -- There are several ways to ponder economics within an evolutionary framework. However, starting with the two (no, not one) 'oldest' professions might be of interest: head-butting (see Remarks 07/29/2011) and, then, that which is usually cast as the oldest. Which came first (the meme: the chicken or the egg)?

Modified: 12/15/2012

Lessons can appear everywhere one might look for them

Moral: Wherein we consider the "life and lessons" of a non-poor janitor.

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The Washington Post, April 25, 2015 - column by Barry Ritholtz.

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Lots to say, at some point.

In short, though, they better sell quick, otherwise the air will escape.

Remarks:  Modified: 04/28/2015

04/28/2015 -- Now, a few hours later. His collection would be a good basis for a study. All sorts of questions loom. Say, what if he had died at 84 or 85? One can always hold and hope for a good price, assuming that you don't have something like the Lehman Brothers bit that he bought. Then, more than 1/2 of the collection might be expected to pay off. ... The key issue is that equity collections do not pay off for everyone; this payout (it would be good to know the specifics of the accounting) is an exception. Has anyone done this type of analysis? ... At least the talk now is how we've seen these things go sky high with little participation. Yes, indeed. That is the whole point.

The ideological errors of capitalism IV - Made offs

Moral: Wherein we consider that the ideological problems, namely shell games, unconscionable exploitation of Adam Smith, and the Ca-pital-sino, are not sufficient. We need others (as it is of detriment of the people).

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Ideological errors:

I - Casino, II - Adam Smith, III - Shell games, IV - Made-offs, V - Culture, VI - Classism, VII - Wealth, VIII - Disingenuity, IX - ... (list does not end)

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Which are? Let's take just one. That the Madoffs (made-offs), and the Ponzis, are the real representatives of capitalism. They promise riches, exhort us to labor for gains and glories, and pilfer the till.

Of yes, there are others. We get those captains of industry, too, with enormous pockets who seem to be at the edge of legality. Or, if they stay from that edge, they're near some ethical (moral) edge. But, who cares about that?

The underlying nature of the current scheme, especially as exhibited by the equity markets, is taking profit at the top from the loads of money brought in by new suckers. And, this is called 'profit' as if such gains could be considered reward for real effort.

It was interesting to watch the recent inflation of the market. Yes, thanks to Ben, and those he muscled, there was oodles of money allowed via low interest, special loans (oh yes, Ben, like the confessional, never known publicly), purchase of toxic waste from idiots, and more. This money went to the inflation of the market, not to building anything of substance.

At the same time, real prices have been deflating. Businesses couldn't get loans. The jobless remain such. There are a slew of things that aren't right, folks.

Now, the whole mechanism (from which comes the mania) is supported by a vast informational framework consisting of analysts, reporters, and naive administrators, like Timothy (little Timmy) and runs for 6 1/2 hours, in the use, on five days a week. Thankfully, we do get a respite from the mania for two days a week, and the occasional holiday. Yet, one could very well imagine that the gaming never ends for some.

No wonder things get frothy (thanks, Minsky, for showing us what Ben ought to look at).

Business Week recently reviewed a book detailed how Markopolos tried to get people to think correctly about Madoff's scheme. The book describes the hubris of expecting something for nothing. In fact, that some notion of in-crowd status (which was one of Madoff's lures) predominated shows just how deeply these pilfering mechanisms are within the capitalistic scheme.

So, 'fat cat' attainment is our primary goal, people?

Plenty have commented to the review. Some of the comments mention that there are plenty of such schemes, namely Ponzi, that we accept as normal.

One example, as we all know, is that Social Security has been taking money from workers for years in the guise of providing retirement funding to these same workers. These monies were then expropriated by the US in exchange for IOUs which are now coming due.

So, who is going to fund the IOUs needed by Social Security to handle the influx of the boomers?

The basic economic issue is that future payments are always expected to be based upon some current set of assumptions and an economic framework to build something that will pay. Then, we expect there to be sufficiently stability for the payout to come to fruition.

But, we've let a whole bit of notions, like leverage, to warp the model. At one time, loans were based upon collateral. If the loan could not be paid, at least, the lender could get something from the collateral. Yet, there is a premise there, to boot, about the collateral being of value sufficient to cover the loan. Leverage can allow speculative malfeasance of sorts.

Operational modes, related to proper valuation, due diligence, and the like, were learned by hard lessons. Yet, these always seem so easily forgotten in the heat of the equity frenzy.

One reason that the equity mania seems to take hold is that the ponzi-like nature is hidden. Rather than this (the market) being a mechanism to build for the future, it becomes a get-rich scheme. That is, we get to the Ponzi-like, almost by necessity.

Many see the problem, but any attempt at rectification gets bogged down in rhetoric which is probably a natural outcome, politically.

Too, there are other types of malefactors (bond big-rigging) out there.

So, what are the guys like Big Ben and Timmy supposed to do? We'll get to that.

Remarks:

01/08/2025 -- It's interesting how the world has morphed due to computational flim flam (thanks, mathematics for letting us down). GenAI as a package for exploiting via shenanigans: Is OpenAI's new model O3 approaching AGI? (link to Quora, Dr. Jo). 

01/08/2019 -- Added in the index of posts on this subject.

02/28/2011 -- Bernie has lessons for us.

04/27/2010 -- Need to add the political set of truths, such as cat and mouse.

04/16/2010 -- Rotten to the core. Does not have to be!!

03/21/2010 -- Read about Timmy: Atlantic ("Would it have been better to have the stock market where it was in March, the economy still falling, and unemployment much higher?” -- huh?), New Yorker, ...

03/20/2010 -- Big Ben says that bailing out the big banks was (or is it is?) 'unconscionable' yet was this not what he did?

Modified: 01/08/2025

Systemic risk

Moral: Wherein we continue the Quants series.

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We're not picking on these lowly workers; no, the intent is to get at the motivation behind the scene. What is that? Well, it's essentially a "license to steal" (concept has been used before) that seems to have become acceptable, if enough money is behind the thrust and if a market ideology is overlaid as a cloak.

James Fallows (Atlantic) says that Dr Doom (who has some good news) likes Timmy's work. After all, as the NY FED guy, he (Timmy) was talking systemic risk way back in 2003. Perhaps, now he has an opportunity to do something rather than just jaw bone.

Just to get the discussion started, one big piece of systemic risk is the rapid growth of types and kinds of computational resources being applied to support markets. Ah, you say, they could not work without the computer.

That is true. Yet, in many cases, those who provide the service hide behind a proprietary wall. Just remember how Madoff pulled off his feat. Too, that high-frequency trading (see Remarks: Wait! More exposures: "computers, some housed right next to the machines that drive marketplaces like the New York Stock Exchange, enable high-frequency traders to transmit millions of orders at lightning speed and, their detractors contend, reap billions at everyone else's expense." To anyone who isn't at Goldman Sachs or the like, does that appeal to you as the way that we ought to be handling our beans?) is seen with such glamor, with a hint of respectability, suggests something.

Where the heck has common sense gone?

Every day, there ought to be an accounting of the markets that has some meaning. No, not just some figure like the closing DOW. Actually, something like a SOX for the market is a good analogy, yet we all know the grief that that initiative spawned. And, did it prevent this current mess?

Who can do an accounting? Does the FED know its own balance sheet? How can they know the economy's?

Oh, too, the markets are 24/7, you might argue. Ah, is that so by necessity? If we use a biological metaphor, what complex entity does not sleep?

Actually, probably as much effort ought to go into accounting and scrutiny as it does into efforts as maximizing the sizes of some pockets. We can probably use those media who watch (another example) as an example, yet it needs to be a deeper look.

Well, it's obvious that the accounting will be computational. So, there is no reason to take this as the grumblings of one who is anti-progress.

The problem is that the computational is new, non-intuitive, and run by wizards. All of this allows lots of room for exploitation and mischief.

Did I mention mis-used mathematics and theoretical flim-flam? That, too. Of course, truth engineering suggests that there isn't an easy answer (see Remarks).

Or, let's look at it again: Some statements in this blog deal with the Philosophy of Science (here's another nice little rundown), in particular as it applies to one issue contended by mainstream economics against the Vienna school: Critics of the Austrian school contend that by rejecting mathematics and econometrics, it has failed to contribute significantly to modern economics. Additionally, they contend that its methods currently consist of post-hoc analysis and do not generate testable implications; therefore, they fail the test of falsifiability.^[5] Austrian economists contend that testability in economics is virtually impossible since it relies on human actors who cannot be placed in a lab setting without altering their would-be actions.

Ah, falsificationism, but what does that have to do with making oodles of money by the best-and-brightest (see Goldman's Town Hall)?

Well, we can start with lessons to learn. One is that some things are undecidable no matter how much computational power is thrown at them. Therefore, they need considered thought (and voting - ah, not necessarily by a market game!).

Somehow, the PDE aura allows some type of pass on reason (ah, fairy dusting).

Remarks:

01/15/2015 -- This week, this post is getting read. Great! Nice little piece of work (kidding, in part) so many years ago. ... At last, a series that will establish the basis and extensions, as required. We are going to go back to some simple and come forward to the modern, complicated economy. Why? My long chain of ancestors (inherited via Prof. Lucio Arteaga) is one motivation.

12/06/2013 -- If only Ben would put a shot across the bow. He's helped the chimera unfold in unhealthy ways. He could, at least, say a mea culpa.

01/27/2012 -- Ben will continue to sack the savers; he must love the ca-pital-sino.

10/10/2011 -- If the OWS wants specifics, there are plenty to list.

02/01/2011 -- The chimera shines.

10/07/2010 -- Several principles need to be explored, such as the ergodic one.

05/07/2010 -- Out of control, essentially, and not healthy for the backbone.

02/10/2010 -- We could probably use the auto (and recent events) as a way to characterize the concepts of the blog. Of course, we have the value versus quality mis-think as part of the problem. Business Week reports that Toyota was asking suppliers for a 10% cut. Well, such scrimping would have an effect, even if it was only in looks. However, cutting into the life of a system may appear smart but, actually, relies on the same unstable basis as does a lot of economic thinking.

01/03/2010 -- More news on Goldman Sachs as the uber example of 'not on the behalf' comes to fore regularly. It'll need to be a separate subject at some point. Thanks to McClatchy: Nov 1, 2009 & Jan 3, 2010 (update). Goldman has to respond, of course.

12/15/2009 -- Requiem for the dollar (WSJ) and responses.

12/03/2009 -- Rationality and risk. Need a new look.

10/05/2009 -- Ah, yes, on the behalf of.

09/15/2009 -- Lessons, one year after Lehman. Also, Time on culprits. Ben is happy-talking, again.

09/09/09 -- We'll need to look at UUUN, as a framework.

09/04/2009 -- It has been decided about Ben, the saver sacker. We still need to discuss the overarching metaphor for the economy. Quants are it!!

Modified: 01/15/2015

Ben's Lectures III

Moral: Wherein we continue with Ben's look at the mess and its aftermath (do we want to know what roles contributed to the problems and the lessons to be learned by those involved?).

---                       Lecture 1, Lecture 2, Lecture 3, Lecture 4

Foreword: Today was the 3rd (on youtube, transcript (pdf), slides (pdf)). The first two lectures were on 3/20 and 3/22. Material (video, transcript,slides) are available at federalreserve.gov (media center). There will be one more after today. These are being hosted by the George Washington University School of Business. The following are notes and comments that were taken while watching the third video today. See earlier Lecture posts for background.

Note: Since both the transcript and the slides are available with the video, the below notes are terse entries to jog my memory later on. Ben did a good job of talking about the crisis, gave his side of many of the stories (information not available through the press), and supported the actions. He used 'ad-hoc' several times which is in his favor. He expressed the distastefulness of what they had to do (I agree). Next time, he'll talk the future.

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Notes (italics, my aside, sometimes with links - times are clock - CDT):

Last time, we heard about the onset of the crisis. Today, we'll hear 'what he did next' from a prime player.

Ben reminded of the context, the 2008 financial crisis. Too, there are two responsibilities. For the financial stability task, the thing is to act as lender of last resort. For the economic stability task, the focus is on monetary policy, principally interest.

~11:47 -- recap on vulnerabilities (see Lecture II), there were both private and public
     private -- too much leverage (result of the long-going moderation?), exotic securities
    public -- gaps in regulation, even fannie & freddie
      they pioneered securitization, using morgages for packages, but f & f' got to where
         they operated without adequate capital, and other problems that portended problems

     (this was seen, by many, long before the crisis --
                     it would be interesting to list those discussions)

        also, f & f' started to buy packages from others, of unknown value

        on triggers     mostly non-standard mortgages
              payments assumed rising house prices, anytime re-financing (post a year, for example)
                many types, ARM, option-ARMS, too long term 30+ years,
                      even negative amortization

         showed a couple of ads, one offered this: 1% start rate, for a year, only needed to
                   state income (no documentation required), 100% financing, interest only
                           (get this!) debt consolidation (put together your credit card and other debt
                                           rolled into the mortgage)

    so, these things were packaged and sold into the financial market
                    (2011 - Tranche and trash, 2007 - Tranche and truth)
             CDOs - combined mortages, and others
               then tranche'd, which leads to complex and opaque entities
                   these were given AAA (see below)

      sold to pension funds, foreign banks, etc.

~11:57 -- AIG (got special attention several times), used other derivative types
                         to insure these above, which amplified the risk
         
               the AAA?, partly through negotiation

            (essentially, junk offered) large basis for the crisis

     what is a crisis: some illiquid event, causes loss of faith, then panic (runs)

      2006, 2007 - mortgages started to fail, shifting the ground under the securities
             actually, not large losses (compared to movements on the stock market)
               but, no one knew was responsible for what
                        (too, leveraging brought into the securitization scheme)

        during the depression, 1000s of bank failures, small
          2008 Bear Stearns (mar), Lehman Brothers (sep), Merrill Lynch
              and mae and mac (propped up by Treasury)
                   AIG, Washington Mutual Bank, Wachovia (oct)

        for a depression, central bank needs to lend, also be accommodative

            2008 vigorous action by Fed, also G-7 (Oct 10)
                    shows interbank rates, went up (2007), then down (after Oct 10)
                       didn't trust each other 
                (hah! worse than the lemons problem -- "... the recent affair where the 
                       bankers (and other financial types) essentially froze their gaming 
                        as they knew that they were dealing mainly with crooks 
                            (like themselves) ...")
   
      Fed, discount window, longer terms, lower rate, auctions
               new programs, and collateral for loans

      enhance stability, allow availability (didn't work)

     emergency authority already in the law (13-3)
       banks, broker-dealers, paper borrowers, money market funds, asset-based securities
                     that last, consumer credit

        mmfs     buy shares, invest in short-term assets (commercial paper)
                     $1 share price
                 not insured         on demand, plus interest
           90 days, non-financial (payroll, inventories), financial (manage positions)
       lehman created a shock-wave, was into cps, plus mortgage, comm real est securities    
                                    lehman  both cre and mortgage hits
               withdrawals, ..., no new capital, so bankruptcy
                      even Fed tried to help

     mmfs failed their $1, hence redemptions (run or panic)

        Treasury, Fed provided backstop, ..., run ended in a few days

            about billion a day outflow

             mmfs started to drop cp which went into shock
                   cp rates went up    
              so Fed again     bolstered confidence
                   cp rate peaked, then recovered

              mar 08, bear stearns to jp morgan
                  oct 08, fed bailed out AIG
                       AIG said that they would insure what were bad securities
                            (no doubt, all sorts of bonuses for this crap)

               AIG did have collateral, 85 billion

                      Fed repaid, but Treasury own stock
                             distasteful, not to set a precedence

~12:34  too big to fail (will go into next time)
                trying to end this                      

    gdp down 5 percent     manu 30 down       homes 80 down
             serious collateral impact (yeah, savers sacked)

                      8 1/2 million out of work            global slowdown
                threat of a Great Depression

                 it was worse, the policy response seems to have worked

       indicators: stockmarket, 29, 07    truncated timeline, essentially
                         (yet, moral hazard still there - too, we have not
                                un-wound from the computational influences)

             15-16 months, stock price recovered, in U.S.
                       (so, what does this mean beyond aeration?)

           industrial production,        large v,  versus short, less deep v
                       (we'll id the slides when they're out)

~12:39       aftermath next, recovery, change, lessons

questions:
-- why the bad mortgages with high risk? --
      too much confident about prices going up
            1 year, then re-finance            
      demand for the securitized product
         ever-clever finance,  (he said that) 
             took the mix, then engineered AAAs (something from nothing)
               kept the bad pieces or sold
                of course, [would try to] sell them off [if there were a problem]
     it was profitable (short term, yeah bonuses)

-- volcker rule? --
       will talk about this next, reduce risk, prevent banks from doing
             proprietary trading -- legitimate exceptions (hedging, make markets)
               how to keep exceptions in control?
        liquidity - trading volumes  (he sees as important!)
               contagion - sell offs, lower price, puts pressure on those
                     who still hold

-- global collaboration, G-7, bail-out of AIG? --
            some inconsistencies, say Lehman UK and US,
              complexity is that something too big to fail might be international
                    how to help them fail safely?,
       said ad-hoc, no lead time was problematic
            cooperation between federal banks
               some use dollar funding
                  swapped dollars for euros (still in existence)
             coordinated cuts on same day in 08
      cooperation will be an on-going issue

-- off-balance sheet vehicles? --
       accounting rules, create vehicle, bank might own part,
           limited control, so separate organization, to get away with less
                 capital, ..., rules have been re-worked, need to be
            consolidated and put on the books

-- large firms, too big to fail -- how do you decide? --
             no doctrine, judgment on size, impact, etc.
            reform is to get rid of this     bad, unfair, etc.
        said they chose the least bad thing to do
       tried to be conservative
         AIG was obviously in need,
           Lehman was insolvent, couldn't borrow from the Fed
               was before TARP, there was no way to do the lone
         ad-hoc, again
            now, they'll have to assess how critical some bank is
                size, complexity, inter-connectedness, etc.
       on merger, will it create a more dangerous situation?
                numerical thresholds need to be determined
          if bad, no merger
     more focused on stability, group working on metrics, etc.

-- vulnerabilities, ratings, buyers would want better ratings,
             why these didn't come forth?  --
     you would think that it wouldn't be the seller who did the rating
             the buyer bears the risk,
         free rider problem, how to keep the work secret?
               better incentive for credit raters
                 investors would have to save the cost,
                      not want to give it away

Remarks:

12/13/2012 -- Don't know how long this page will be there, Daily Ticker. But, when I looked, 69% had said 'no' (hurt rather than helped) as to whether Ben has helped.

04/03/2012 -- Response 1.

03/28/2012 -- New page covering the series and its material.

03/28/2012 -- Distasteful? Many are saying that (Romney, et al). However, we could have NATIONALIZED the idiots. Perhaps, we ought to have (we would not have been any worse off). Of course, Ben's mind cannot grasp that notion. He says 'ever-clever' finance. Well, their antics hurt the rest. Why is that type of thing allowed? He says accounting is to blame. Who works to monitor/limit the 'smart' idiots and their tactics that lead to inevitable messes? How about having more mature approaches as the standard? Hey, Harvard!! You there? Oh wait, you left that realm in the mid-1800s, right?

03/28/2012 -- Added links. Will update when transcript and slides are available.

Ben needs to think about how he's sacked the savers (they are legion) over the past few years just so that he could get his pseudo-capital markets back up into an inflated mode (as if the ca-pital-sino, as evolved, is it for us). Ah, big guy!

Too, he's looking only at junk via mortgage packaging. Big guy, there were other types, and you know it. Plus, leveraged buyouts have been part of the scene for a long while. In many case, wrecking havoc, in the small, that is much worse than this slowdown which came from silly games.

Modified: 12/13/2012

Coddling

Moral: Wherein we wonder about the morale of the savers (poor dears).

Janet is coddling the jerks. That is, these guys handle billions (trillions). They play games all day with other people's money. Live high on the hog.

Yet, they tantrum'd when Ben merely mentioned taper. Janet continues that kid-gloves treatment.

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This is a real brief look.

However, going back to the beginning, say 2006, we can come forward and note some lessons learned. We saw it better than Ben. We are of the savers who have been flayed.

Just last week, I went and was slapped silly again. The banker telling me that they don't want deposits. You see, they're not really banks anymore.

Janet ought to bounce up to 2%, quickly. Forget the little baby steps that she and the Fed talked about last year. Then, they reneged this year.

And, what have we now? 18K is way to high for the DOW. Oh yes, I know. The whole thrust is to have someone like me go into that silly game. Who will bail me out when the suckers pull out all of the value?

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There could be links here on all of these topics, but I have been ranting along this line for awhile. With reason and a rationale.

The Fed and its ilk need to be thinking of some type of platform that would allow more stable value'd looks than this market thing (Adam rolls over in his grave, continually). Somehow, the money'd crowd got their way. I don't know of academics who want to see stability.

That is because no one (elites, okay?) has really been done down here where we get slapped around all the time. But, the economy is for us, too. Actually, it is more for us. We are millions. Janet, you and your crowd, are a very small minority.

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Stable value. Yes. You float a bond. Then you pay the holder some bit of interest. Not talking a lot. Enough of these would then be sufficient for some little person to have a future.

Forget the big names and brains, like Jamie and all of the rest mentioned here.

The use of computers to play financial games is one symptom of deep problems. Yes. I can talk that.

How about taking that power and applying it to tracking stock? Yes, each one an entity. Who bought, sold, etc. Oh, get rid of the magical multiplier? You bet.

---

Enough, for now. I'm coming back to work here and will lay out the strategy. I'm old. Janet will probably still have no interest during my final years. But, I'll describe how it could be, if those whose input to the whole situation has been warping things for years were constrained, seriously, like to a sandbox with diapers. Then, the mess that we have to clean up would be smaller.

Yes, we changed their diapers and are still dealing with their crap.

Remarks: Modified: 04/02/2016

04/02/2016 --

Cheshire multiple

Moral: Wherein we re-look at a very old issue: only a few get it (many senses, but the dough, as in payout of note) - the most? losers (almost by definition).

A long while ago, I read Marilyn's and Investopedia's explanation of what happens when markets fall like they do (and will). Where did all of that money go? It just vanished, the presses reported. That question was back in 2009, when Ben was still feeling his way through the mess.

I railed then, and have since, about the "stupid" gaming (see chimera). Why is it stupid? Well, about now, when things have inflated (you see, Janet, look at how the financial assets have inflation - sheesh, also we have some costs of our living rising - her little chart is way off base), moms and pops are buying into the game. They are guaranteed losers (the late buyers). Then, we hear that people are borrowing to buy stock.

So, we have to revisit this again. An alternative? Yes, more stable approaches do exist.

One motivation for the revisit is looking at Dalio's take. He shows financial assets in his little model as something that money (and credit) can buy. And, he shows how financial assets can diminish in value. Also, leveraging came up in the video. But. the whole issue of why we have done it this way is ignored. You see, the game, as is, seems to provide a perpetual machine (which we know does not exist) that "feeds the multitude" but actually pays into the pockets of a few (most of them the game owners and controllers). Too, we have led other societies and countries into the same silliness.

---

Now, the title of the post comes from Marilyn's remark. What I have done is put the two responses side by side (Marilyn at Parade, Investopedia staff). Let's look at them and comment below.

You see, Marilyn says that the money disappears. Too, she says that only "a small percentage" can sell to get what they expect (my words, but not arguable except for angel counting). Yet, we have people putting their life's savings, and their retirement plans, upon such a stupid (there I go, again, and I would ask Marilyn, do you think this is how it ought to be?) system. Investopedia says "disappeared into thin air" without an adequate explanation. Yes, financial community, explain yourself, please?

Those who are takers always gloat (ala the 99% and such {explanation 02/18/15 - 99%? yes, as in, those of the 1% who are sitting over the rest - as in, over the 99% in the graphed density function}). Those not taking (but, being took) are multitude, who are mostly enslaved to care for, etc. the gloaters (those who are slowly enmeshing/entrapping reality and us, insidiously - we, the users, need our modernization of the Magna Charta - we'll get back to that).

Anyone care about sustainability into the future? Anyone care that we have indebted future generations?

---

All I can see is that these financial schemes expect an endless line of suckers. The past year or so has given us, once again, bubbles upon bubbles. Some, like the mortgage expert - what's his name? - who said the word but didn't go further. Janet seems to not notice, given her lessons from Alan and Ben.

Remarks:  Modified: 06/01/2015

03/07/2014 -- Not arguing that equity ownership is not necessary. Rather, it is the financial market's current state of evolution (madness, really) that is suspect; especially, the use of algorithms to game the system has no basis beyond merely mercenary motivations (resulting in useless churn accompanied by endless pilfering). ... One thing to notice is that these financial dealings have little to do with the operation of a business. And, as we will show, the modern configuration of these is very much like a casino (general adoption of gaming as the basis for ontology -- sheesh, I agree with my friend, Albert, on this - we'll get to that , too). ... We intend to get back to cosmology. And, the Wilshire 5000 looks like a better Index to use for our purposes. So, we will use it.   

10/16/2014 -- After a very lllooooonnnggggg upswing, we have seen six days of downward-ness. And, the falls are quick. Cheshire multiple goes both ways. But, we see, now, the coo-cooing of the Fed. Too, golden sacks is being a front man for the panhandlers that are the financial types. My query is who is priming the pump on these bottoms which funds the upswing. You see, that pulls in the hapless who feel as if they have lost out and want in. In reality: lambs being led to the slaughter. And, by the way, there is a better way to handle the whole affair. Let the ca-pital-sino folks play in a sandbox.

10/30/2014 -- Where are we? For one, let's talk how most are losers, okay (due to idiotically applied multiples)? This can be ignored when their reality is pushed outside of common awareness. So, we have the top tier (0.001 or less) gaining under the present scheme (even with it being stopped, QE, that is, the latest of it). The other? Dire straits, indeed. Yet. the talking heads chase the DOW daily, as if it has meaning (ah, why this?).

02/16/2015 -- We are elevating the discussion: see Wikipedia's Efficient-market hypothesis.(see the Talk page section on Cheshire multiple). The framework will use Minsky's thought. However, the importance goes broader and deeper. We will have to start from the beginning. The computer's value will (ought to) be a proper financial analysis (an analog of the old back office work, daily) that every day tells us the real value (to be defined).

02/18/2015 -- Same as illusion of liquidity (see Mohamed El-Erian's recent comment). ... With spring break coming up, here is a comment at another blog that used that occasion for a metaphor: June 9, 2014.

06/01/2015 -- A little late: Magical multiplier, Let them eat cake, Beyond your wildest dream.

2020 begone

Moral: Wherein we muse about the tomorrows. 

Lots of themes pending. The U.S. FED just pulled out all stops and placed us in unknown territory that's even more remote than where Ben/Janet left us. Which is okay, as things will pull out. Will we learn the necessary lessons?

So, with the proverbial punt down the road, we'll let the year end. 

Remarks: Modified: 12/29/2020

12/29/2020 --

Harvard, value and quality I

Moral: Wherein we look at a current situation and argue that the best let us down.

---

How exactly did these people let us down? What are we to do about it?

Well, we can look at the issues. To do so means that we are going to have to go back to the beginning, 1636, and come forward. But, let's set the stage first. Subsequent posts will carry the discussion forward.

--- Foreword:

In an earlier post, while talking about how Adam Smith's ideas (we need a relook) seem to lead to gravy trains and salivation (definition of a politico being, he/she who salivates when a buck is passed beneath the nose), we mentioned Naisbitt's book in which he uses early USA history to characterize some of China's future. Say what?

So, that conceptual view out of Harvard motivated a long-needed look at what went down here (on this side) with the onset of emigres from across the pond coming over. And, where else is there more opinion offered about the foundations of the USA than that related to New England?

Well, folks, it turns out that we have a 'real' example to offer, namely an oft-overlooked Old Planter. But, we'll be getting to that later.

You see, Harvard is right across the river(s) from where the earlier actions took place, and, when one considers the (d)evolution of Harvard (say, as captured here by wiki editors -- see Remarks, 08/13/2011), the institution is archetypal, and much more, in very many ways; some of these are very much apropos to the discussions that will be needed (future posts).

As well, Harvard has stressed elitism (see wiki), at times, which may be natural given its start as God's favorite. Now, is not hubris one characteristic of the elite? And, does not any engineer (yes, as in MIT) worth his or her salt know that nature rules us not the other way around?

We are at a time when the wheels (economically, politically, ...) seem to be spinning. Where is the grip going to come from? Ah, the lessons of New England have the answer to that, as we hope to show (perhaps, we can even use some of that learned from Salem's tribulations to which, by the way, Harvardites contributed early).

Now, to show that we have to deal with finance too, let's continue with Harvard. During the times that elitism took control, the school was rich by any standard. For one thing, 'rich' referred to things dealing with lucre rather than, say, 'rich in spirit' as one would expect given all those Church of England brilliant lights who were involved with the institution's start. Yes, we have to ask, was Harvard a 'city on the hill' that was of unparalleled benefit to humankind?

Well, those things were 150 years ago (see Remarks, 08/13/2011). What about now? Just a couple of years ago, Harvard bragged about their bounty's (what's it called? endowment?) increases from playing financial games and the consequential immense proportions. In fact, they paid some dude outrageous sums for his efforts (ignoring the possible besmirching of the reputation). Then, it wasn't long, and we saw Harvard (and many other schools) crying poor (toxic shockandawe). Who, of a mature mind, would not ask, did not 'you idiots' get what you deserved?

Then, about the same time, the students (bless their hearts) were arguing with the big pockets about the fact that lowly Harvard workers could not sustain themselves decently with their wages.

We could go on but will not. However, consider this: the old guy mentioned above may be more of the 'backbone' of this country than any glib scholar and spewer of words (God, the verbosity in those messages to/fro London - the Church must have selected for this trait in their upper class) that grabs glory and pockets of bucks. It is this backbone, as infrastructure, that we have caused to be 'out-housed' and hollowed out, for the sole benefit of lining the pockets of the few, mostly the elite.

--- Word:

And so, we find that we will have to deal these concepts, namely value, quality, and near-zero.

A couple of days ago, in relation to Toyota's dilemma, a professor (UChi) said that Toyota may have gone too far after value while allowing quality less focus. You see, some think that these have some type of reciprocal relationship.

Ah? Was not the professor talking some notion of 'value' that most likely goes back to the Harvard Business School? How did this happen? That it did is one of the arguments for bringing 'near-zero' into play in discussing how to resolve these issues. You see, 'quality' is of value to all parties concerned, especially when one looks at the commonweal.

Oh, what is the commonweal? Well, those at Harvard ought not have to ask that question. That some may do so ought to give us pause (as ought a whole bunch of things). And, whose 'commonweal' are we to consider?

Well, in the case of Toyota, it would be global. However, it would include all sorts of parties, even pedestrians who may unluckily get in front of an auto that has a stuck accelerator.

Aside: That remark refers to those people who while using their feet increasingly meet up with autos that are running on our streets with no 'mind' in charge, rather we have a zombie sitting where a human ought to be.

Does it not look as if we need to have another go around about value, especially when we consider the various roles and responsibilities involved? That is one intention here, yet the problems of determining value, no matter the type, will remain, especially given that the genie is out of the bottle (in many ways).

Again, pointing to Harvard, the operational stance that we need, with its scientific and technological basis, will require some type of practical support out of the academic framework.

What will this be? Do we know? Good questions, for another day.

There are some major themes to bring up: innumeracy does not equate idiocy (very important), ungrounded genius is more stupid than well-founded normality, ... (it could be a long list, however let's, again, cut it short).

--- Afterword:

As we look at operational issues related to the themes here, one assessment of quality applies to people, their talents, and the potentials. Oh, we know, there are many open issues involved here, yet we will need human talent to control the genie.

Why bring up the old guy who was successful in bringing in, and raising, a family despite the inherent troubles and all of the dangers (natural, social, political)? We expect that we'll be addressing some things like the absence of the lordly prince syndrome among other things. That is, there is a certain effectiveness which accompanies success.

And, running off after abstracted chimeras as we have seen the past decade, or so, is not effective for the commonweal. Perhaps, someone in Harvard has already figured this out. Do I see shades of Cotton Mather here (kidding, of course)?

You see, the first 150 years of Harvard were in support of spreading the Christian faith (within a certain type of framework) across the land and elsewhere (again, see wiki's description). During the 1700s, the class size was such that thousands graduated with an flavored academic experience.

After secularization showed up, perhaps, graduates were more productive, meaning being able to play roles beyond those that are scarce in number. In fact, a point of pride for the institution is the number of graduates who have been recognized (43 Nobel laureates).

Again, one might ask why Harvard? Well, a few reasons were given above. Consider this, though. Is it not out of Harvard Business School that we got the emphasis on securitization, short-term profit focus, globalization/colonization, and more (we can build a real long list - perhaps should)? Oh, business schools, in general, one might say. Well, where is the leadership toward the better (please, not more rational, unless you mean non-insane) side of things that one might expect of Harvard?

So many questions, but we'll persist. Hasta la vista.

Remarks:

06/14/2014 -- Cognitive elitism. Will be getting back to this.

08/15/2013 -- Nice viewpoint. Farce, indeed (chimera). Buyers and sellers are Investors (sometimes). Many elites see their gifts as carte blanche to screw over those less gifted (in essence, a main cause of the continual strife that humans face -- Harvard, at one time, may have had an ethical edge - can it get it back?). Who is the fairest of the elite, so to speak? For sustainability to come about, those of the highest quality need to be of the service mentality (yes, perhaps we could find someone at Harvard Divinity to explain this to the gifted in their neighborhood). Service? Try military without being of the O-series, for instance. But, a national service would allow many types of contributions. Foreigners? Yes, they would have to do it to boot.

06/11/2013 -- CDOs and tranching, once again.

05/14/2013 -- Still the second most-read article (post). Ought to bring this up to date. As we see with Gauss' view of things, there is a spread around what might be termed the mean. Depending upon the domain, we'll be able to put people into categories according to this way of looking at things (remember, it's not intrinsically based, okay?). If we're looking at accumulations (depth of asset base or a myriad of other ways),    we have to have those on either side of the mean. No one, of the embodied type, wants to know the left most (however, the Creator does). The rightmost? Most aspire to this. Not all (and, Harvard types could talk to this old guy about that -- we'll go back to the beginning and before). Most will only dream of being on that side of things. Those there, mostly, think it's due them (ah, yes). ... Let's stop that and turn the table a little. One characteristic of those enjoying admittance is scoring highly on tests which is indicative of various abilities that we seem to think of as important. Yes, some correlation does come about. Are there failures of those types (yes, indeed, the problem is that many times they bring down a whole bunch of lesser folk into their turmoil - ah, the way of the world?). Too, the testing stresses, many time, numeric abilities. You know, such insights (many times, not wise at all) has led us (mankind, okay?) down perdition-laden paths where we overlay that viewpoint (yes, thanks to Carl Friedrich and many more) on our being (Harvard-ites ought to know of this; I would bet that many do not) to the extent of suffocation and worse. ... So, we're May, 2013. Ben has a 15K DOW as an accomplishment (congratulations are in order). But, he has not much about unwinding (except for thinking), though we've asked for this for years now. Guess what? We're back to the heavy leveraging idiocy.

01/23/2013 -- Things are looking up: Read free or die.

10/16/2011 -- Harvard is 375 this year. That, one might say, will precipitate a closer look, soon.

09/21/2011 -- On Wealth and the CEO MVP.

08/13/2011 -- See the Feb 2010 version of the page in order to see the referenced section which disappeared on 12 May 2010. The missing section (Elitism) had been added on 24 Jan 2010. It consisted of earlier material, but the newer, historic organization made the text stand out. The missing text does relate that huge 'endowment' stature was almost expected.

08/13/2011 -- See Cambridge non-commoners.

04/20/2011 -- Simple living (see Remarks 04/15/2011 - game theory), as opposed to greediness.

04/04/2011 -- Boston U's opinion.

01/19/2011 -- For the most, things are dire, not by necessity.

11/11/2010 -- Harvard II, Ca-ital-sino, Adam again

07/02/2010 -- Anyone at Harvard with the sense of justice like Perelman's?

05/25/2010 -- Who will (or can) lead out of the morass?

02/19/2010 -- As said earlier, there will be coming posts related to this theme. In the meantime, start to look at the New England experience and what it means now. Of course, we already know the themes, such as computation's genie and control of this force, mathematization's diminution of mankind, the necessity for Harvard to step up to its role, and much more.

02/10/2010 -- We could probably use the auto (and recent events) as a way to characterize the concepts of the blog. Of course, we have the value versus quality mis-think as part of the problem. Business Week reports that Toyota was asking suppliers for a 10% cut. Well, such scrimping would have an effect, even if it was only in looks. However, cutting into the life of a system may appear smart but, actually, relies on the same unstable basis as does a lot of economic thinking.

02/09/2010 -- We need to retrain the driving brain.

02/06/2010 -- Let's see, we can start to count the ways. Take term limits, for instance, which definitely are an issue. In some cases, we have 'lordly princes' who get into office and sit there, for their own glorification (and the regal perks). Then, they're more influenced by lobbyists throwing around money (causing salivation) than by their own constituents.

Now, you have to give these people some credit. They do flummox the public into a continued vote. So, to go into that phenomenon is a whole other story.

Of course, these dynamics (independence/freedom versus cronyism - you see, there is probably a better way to characterize this, as it's a framework that adjusts by whatever basis it sits on) go way back, as said above (all the way to Plimouth and Cape Ann). It's natural that Harvard ought to be the center for a more full understanding of these issues (which would mean that money would be of less 'value' to you guys/gals than is truth). Where is such a study?

On a similar note, academic institutions breed something similar. How? What is there for support of the autodidact, in the sense of not being mentored? Of course, in this case, as we see in general, we have to maintain (after first attaining) a balance between the individual and the public good. How would an autodidact be rated? Institutions have their credentials and certifications. Why bring it up?

The whole notion of innumeracy not being idiocy needs to be looked at. Of course, Harvard, via Howard Gardner, may have already started to address these issues (and their conflicts).

Too, no one but John Galt is mentor-less. The issue is more, who does one select as mentor? For most people, parents are generally the first. There are other involuntary, for the autodidact, mentors throughout one's life. The problem is, as we see from early New England, can a social setting allow autodidacts? Actually, we have to ask if allowing autodidacts is, by necessity, disruptive?

The thing of the web is that expression can be offered, within legal limits, that is not under some mark of approval (imprimatur).

Modified: 06/14/2014

Map and territory

Moral: Wherein we consider these two concepts, further.

Why? Alan Greenspan's (King Alan's) new book (soon to be released) uses them in the title. Nice. See pre-Review at WSJ.

---

Alan (the awakening?)
from WSJ review

We first broached the subject in 2007, under the auspices of 7oops7: Territory and map. Essentially, the problem causes lots of oops. You know what? It's not a simple little thing, rather the subject deals with the basis of our knowledge and effectiveness (has from the get-go, actually the topic allows to address broad-ranging issues that are of great depth - you see, the modern ilk with its computational frameworks (and money searching) tries to normalize, reduce to nothing the related complicated set of issues).

That centrality is why the next usage was under the umbrella of Truth Engineering: Territory, map, truth. Our effectiveness principally encourages hubris, it would seem. But, folks (especially the rich ones), there is more to the reality (if you don't know of near-zero, it's time to discuss and learn). Notice, too, slogans (Joel Orr is the source for one of these) can apply.

---

Now, in the context of FEDaerated, we have brought up the subject a time or two. The intent is to keep the discussion going, due to its importance (the whole issue is further troubled by computation, which is a bane of the worse sort).

Here are the posts, in reverse order.

• To computational hell and back (May 2013) -- Depicting a type of hell that results from several things, but two of the largest contributors are: over-reliance on systems to the extent that the map becomes the territory, inordinate chasing after the buck causing shortcuts to become the norm for systems.  
• Money and value (Jan 2010) -- Fiat money is an issue. Human nature is problematic. Where is the glimmer of sanity with regard to money (which could be a simple matter with the proper viewpoints allowed to surface)?  
• Year-end recap (Dec 2009) -- One has to ask: is it the best-and-brightest set, and those with numeracy abilities, that is more prone to the idiocy of map-territory mashing? Yes, Harvard, come talk to me about that. 
• Why not? (Sep 2009) -- Dealing with fundamental issues that some might see as a closed case. Ah, is that not hubris talking? A little while ago, risk managers were making claims about their prowess. Not long after, the mess started from which Main Street has not recovered, as of yet. Were lessons learned?     

---

Now, at the level at which Alan reigned, we see politics as being more important than reality (Oh, polls are supposed to be as strong as sensor input? By the way, markets have the same fallibility, though their usefulness has been demonstrated (without proper delineation of the limits that are necessary) somewhat.). We'll have to look at that in depth.

So, I'm looking forward to reading more about Alan's side of things. Of course, it can be fun to run after money, and big bucks. But, that is not the smart thing (yes, the Warrens, et al, notwithstanding) by necessity.

As I've said before, the whole financial thing ought to be run by people who are money-driven (just like the military is not run by the power-driven) and for whom morals are more important than big pockets. And, we can do this, despite the fact that those who lean to fat-catted'ness have run things (amok'ly) from the beginning.

Remarks: Modified: 10/27/2013

10/22/2013 -- Three articles of note: Interview with Druckenmiller (hearing the 0.001% talk about ill-begotten gains, not his, of course), HFT Algorithms (on bragging about short holding times), Barbarians at the Gateways (contrite?, but without mea culpas).

10/27/2013 --Ben has sacked the savers for years now, slapping them silly. Why? A WSJ article looked at high-class pawnshops a couple of days ago. These fill the need for people who need money but cannot get it from the banks (stupidity there, too). So, they use collateral for a loan and pay high interest. How high? Some pay over 200%, per year. What is Ben paying or having banks pay their savers (customers)? Way less than 1%. That is the best example of being out of whack with economic realities that one could ask for. Yet, does the Fed see? Why is the interest low? To push savers toward higher risk? To appease the gaming crowd (most likely this, as these are big-pocketed folks)? To help people afford housing (on someone else's back?)? ... Janet's take on this is unknown, but she has to know that they're looking like idiots. You know what? Most of those loans are paid, even with the high interest. And, still, Ben slaps the savers (King Alan mentioned saving, of late). We ought to ask the Fed, what happened to prudence or does it like to reward profligacy?

KBE, what is it?

Moral: Brief intro to KBE. A start, thereof. 

GenAI/LLM has lessons to learn beyond being silly and gluttonous. How can we derive these without ruining the plante? 

• KBE, continued         draft article on Linkedin 

Remarks: Modified: 07/03/2025

07/03/2025 --

Ben's precipice

Moral: Wherein we consider that Ben can claim a little victory with consequences that will only be known much later.

---

We remember Alan's put and its effects (still being unwound and analyzed). What will we remember of Ben?

---


Watching Bloomberg, with 1/4 attention, saw a momentary flash of a graph. On it, there was a sharp drop being displayed. What was being graphed? Well, it wasn't the coming chasm (or whatever is the label for what is pending coming next January). What was being displayed was the long-term rate for Treasuries.


---

Well, Ben has been after that, for a while. So, does he have a sense of accomplishment? Does he have any qualms about putting a whole set of nails in the coffin of the middle class, and the savers? He's been putting it to the latter for a bunch of years now.

---

As Ben pushes toward the chimera (yes, bulls notwithstanding), things become even more dire for a whole bunch of folks. Who is not in dire straits? Those (some) playing games with the chimera, usually from a position that has plenty of backup (including, ultimately, bailout from the FED -- namely, we the taxpayers).

---

He wants things to be based upon this shaky platform that enriches the few and impoverishes the most. The notion of steady, and stable, seems to have gone with the wind. Yet, each who reaches effective maturity has had more elements of the stable than not. The rich know this (see 21 ways - at Business Insider); some try to keep the proper lessons from being learned by those who are most in need of the insights. Oh, find your own bootstraps is the message to one who doesn't even have boots, or if there are boots, the straps have been stolen.

---

On the 21 ways, it might be interesting to look at these in the context of the blog's viewpoint. Take #17, for instance, where the focus is on earnings versus savings. You see, the chimera, above, is thought of as earnings. Okay. Tell me truthfully, did those who rode on Zuck's coattails really earn anything (as in, what of value did they contribute besides big pockets, being at the right place at the right time, or some other pseudo-contributory role)? Yes, you guys, come explain this taking to us. What ought we call those 'gains' whose influence is mainly gaming that is meant to up the take of those who can (when the time to pull the plug arises) exploit these types of situations? Earnings? Remember, too, these 'gains' (even if very short term in nature) receive preferential tax treatment (thanks, those responsible for this). Ah, we'll have to look at that in more depth. 'earnings' can range from the hardscrabble income (can be characterized by so many examples -- from subsistence upward) to thievery (modern earnings, many times).

Ben, you really know better than to stoke this fire.

Remarks:

03/17/2013 -- The metaphor ought to be rats in the grain bin.

03/05/2013 -- Ben reigns, but the savers' faces are bruised from his slapping.

02/26/2013 -- What? Ben doesn't have any influence with his put?

12/13/2012 -- Don't know how long this page will be there, Daily Ticker. But, when I looked, 69% had said 'no' (hurt rather than helped) as to whether Ben has helped.

10/24/2012 -- Ben is sticking to his guns. Lucy people like myself will continue to pay through the nose. Thanks, big guy.

09/13/2012 -- So, Ben, backed up by his cronies, is doing QE3. As well, they're talking low rates until mid-2015. Why? So that the casino will continue with its chimera! We're going to end up with savers being sacked for more than 1/2 a decade. Preposterous. The main tale? Those with are doing fine and growing larger. Those without are more dire. In the middle, squeezed. The first class is a small subset, as we all know.

09/08/2012 -- Thanks are owed to Larry for being one of the few who stayed on message.

Modified: 03/05/2013

Blogs on Janet's inquisition

Moral: Wherein we point to tracings left by those who are following Janet's ordeal.

I haven't paid attention. If I would have a chance to talk to Janet, I would bring up stable value and its usefulness as a concept (especially for those intellectuals who seem to dominate the economic realms - with their beliefs that data-driven is more real than illusive). Perhaps, Ben will learn something ex post facto as King Alan seems to suggest for himself.

Too bad that these lessons learned are not of use before the fact. Things don't look good for Main Street. Some are borrowing to play the market. Others, who were cautious before, are risking now their futures, again. Of course, of those who lost, many have not recovered (and will not recover).

--

Market Watch mentioned that Janet said that there is not stock bubble. If that is so, Janet, why is there a big void in the pockets of savers? You see, get outside the balloon so that you can see the expanding surface - let me explain.

---

These are two blogs that I saw mentioned on FB. I'll wait until after the fact to get into more detail

• Janet Yellen's nomination hearing - live blog and video
• Stock market live blog: Yellen says stocks aren't in bubble territory 

---

Yes, Janet, and pigs do fly (the stinker that we see now has been aerated more than a Macy balloon by you, Ben, and your ilk). 

Worship,
as an imperative;
of what, though?

Look, Janet. You guys just hint at a taper (removing the narcotic), and the market goes crazy. Given what we saw then, perhaps the market (as represented by the DOW) ought to be somewhere around 10K.

From whence that added 5K of supposed, value? 

Savers, for one. These have been slapped silly.

Ben's effect is so bad now that U.S. bond holders (remember, savings bonds?) are paying to hold these pieces of patriotic jest. The joke is on those who ante'd during bond campaigns. That is only one of several deleterious effects. 

Anyone at the Fed care? Doesn't seem so as their eyes are on the contentment of the moolah crowd.

These market guys (those who run the game and are the chief players) cannot even go without their training wheels (yet, rake in the bucks?). Of course, that's on the backs of Main Street'rs.

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By the way, stable value? I am not mentioning this as a type of fund. No. Just like you, Janet, go home to a stable environment (we would hope), people need similar with their money. There is no such nowadays. Why? Intellectual flim-flam, for one. Computerized conundrums for another (fed by the flim-flam). All around deterioration of any sense of value (intrinsic) that arises from moral thought. Ah, the list is long.

As said five years ago, finance as fiction. What have we learned? 

Remarks:  Modified: 12/29/2013

11/14/2013 -- There seems to be talk about no inflation. Hah! I can point to several aspects of daily life that are more expensive. The Fed guy arguing his data-driven methods is looking at the wrong thing with the wrong color glasses. The main bafflement for me? How can one look at the last year and not say that these market processes are not over-heated (ever heard of Minsky?)? As of now, the energy devoted to maxing out might push things upward yet, but those "earnings" are ill-begotten (so much ponzi/made-off that it would be laughable if it did not have such a harmful effect on the people (regular souls, okay? those who aren't puffing the pipe with whatever Ben put in the thing). Too, the higher it is allowed to go, the further the fall. As some are cautioning, the hurt will be much worse than the last time around. A slight bafflement is how the system allows the turkeys to trash things while pulling everyone else into the mire. A stable approach would isolate the players/gamers to a sandbox (yes, let them crap and clean their own diapers). And, the "stable" about which I am talking is as certain as the sun coming about every morning, clouds or not. The stupidity of the intellectuals? They've been  lured by mathematical chimeras into a corner and cannot (or will not) make the adult stand of admitting their mistake. Meanwhile, the real people abide (it's more than just the age-old issues of lord/serf, feudalism, and such - we're talking maturity - wait, that out of DC and Wall Street?).

11/14/2013 -- Dudley is funny. He's part of the pusher crowd. They are as much to blame as are the junkies (users). Moral banker? Not silly, but nowadays, it would be a rare thing to find.

11/17/2013 -- Last week, one of the politico wags asked Janet why she can't see that the current mode favors the pockets of the elite. Yes, the equity side is getting all of the beans masking over debt, leveraging, and such. Janet, being the trooper that she is, deflects the question by saying that the housing market is better or something like that. Quick on the feet, I suppose. Housing? While millions of savers are being slapped silly?

11/19/2013 -- Not exactly related to Janet following Ben, but it does have nice graphics. Too, it uses casino.

12/29/2013 -- Small change to the question for Janet. Also, this seems to have been a popular post. The chimera continues. Some may wonder why I use the term. Well, what we ought to have is a number based upon what people paid for stock with some reasonable increase. You see, with the current method of spreading the latest price everywhere (talk about density), we have, by definition, a made-off (remember, he -as in Bernard Madoff - replaced Ponzi by several measures) scheme (why is this allowed? - other than to attract the moms and pops who cannot afford to lose their little collection?). ... There was a little hiatus from which we'll be back. Hopefully, Janet's brain will prove to be different than Ben and his predecessors (and, don't cast aspersions this way of any sort related to ill-reputed mindsets- and, please, read the latest reported findings on gender differences in structural matter from which we would expect operationally framed divergences, as well, ...).