Tuesday, June 5, 2012

Got the crash wrong?

Moral: Wherein we try to see why tranche on tranche and bubbling did not attribute to the crash.

In particular, we'll use a The Atlantic article: How we got the crash wrong. William D. Cohan, the author, acknowledges, as do many of the comments, that the leverage ratio was high. However, he sees incentives as being more of a factor, as in providing a motivation for the 'gaming' which is so problematic.


Well, in a world of fiat money, what do we know anyway? The whole thing is mostly just blips on screens with databases as support. But, then, how do we get away from 'funny' money? Ben can't say.

Yet, even that the basis is nothing but 'promise' and such; we need to limit what types of limbs are defined and how far people go out them (as in, out on a limb).


This post is mainly for completion as we covered 'leverage' in all three blogs: here, 7oops7, truthengineering. It is the "perpetual motion machine" (in other words, farcically proposed and used to dupe).

So, the article provides another view to consider.


03/05/2013 -- Ben reigns, but the savers' faces are bruised from his slapping.

12/13/2012 -- Don't know how long this page will be there, Daily Ticker. But, when I looked, 69% had said 'no' (hurt rather than helped) as to whether Ben has helped.

06/14/2012 -- The same issue had this article which we'll get back to (CSI: Housing Bust). It details some of the culprit'ry. Financiers are a whole other class. Evidently, the mania about risk forever hogtied left a lot of room for playing around (Jamie is still under its spell).

06/05/2012 -- Yes, something for nothing, essentially. Without limiting bounds (it seems), who can say this: stop, it's becoming unreal (meaning what?)? Fairy dusting. Except, we do see 'real' things being done despite all of the noise.

Modified: 03/05/2013

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